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SPECIAL REPORT
The Case for Preempting SALT Cap Workarounds
by Hayes R. Holderness
In late 2017 the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (P.L. 
115-97) was passed into law.  Controversy 
instantly ensued. One major controversy 
revolves around the capping of the Internal 
Revenue Code section 164 state and local tax 
deduction at $10,000 per taxpayer (the SALT 
cap).1 Viewed by many blue states as an attack 
on their citizens, the SALT cap has spurred 
counterattacks in the form of state legislation 
designed to provide  taxpayers with an avenue 
to counter the effects of the SALT cap (the SALT 
cap workarounds).2 While others have and are 
considering the effectiveness of the SALT cap 
workarounds,3 this essay explores a more basic 
question: do the states have the power to lob 
such counterattacks and facilitate taxpayers’ 
federal tax avoidance? The answer is more 
nuanced than it might first appear; unlike 
individual tax avoidance actions, the states’ 
actions raise the specter of federal preemption. 
The U.S. Constitution provides that federal 
law is the supreme law of the land; it preempts 
conflicting  state law.4 Therefore, it would seem 
that the SALT cap workarounds are invalid 
because they intentionally frustrate the operation 
of the SALT cap. However, the Supreme Court has 
often hesitated to find that federal law has 
implicitly preempted conflicting state law when 
the conflict is merely incidental to the legitimate 
exercise of a traditional state power. What’s more, 
the  primary  SALT  cap  workarounds  rely  on  
IRC  section  170’s  deduction  for  charitable 
contributions to achieve their goal, arguably 
advancing the policy behind that part of the 
federal tax law. Do these two facts shield the 
workarounds from preemption? Where a state 
specifically targets the federal law with 
workarounds that are more formalistic than 
substantive exercises of state  powers,  the  
answer  appears  to  be  “no.” The  more  
substantive  the  state’s  action,  the  more likely it 
is to pass a preemption challenge. This may leave 
room for pre-TCJA state programs that operate 
similarly to the SALT cap workarounds to stand 
while new workarounds fall.
The essay proceeds in four parts. Part I 
provides basic background on the SALT cap 
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In this viewpoint, 
Holderness examines the case for preemption 
of states’ workarounds of the federal state and 
local tax deduction cap.
1
E.g., Richard Rubin, “As Treasury Targets Workarounds to Tax Law, 
Impact May Extend Beyond High-Tax States,” The Wall Street Journal, 
June 27, 2018; and Alan Rappeport and Jim Tankersley, “I.R.S. Warns 
States Not to Circumvent State and Local Tax Cap,” The New York Times, 
May 23, 2018.
2
E.g., Paige Jones, “Legislature Passes Nation’s First SALT Cap 
Workaround,” State Tax Notes, Apr. 9, 2018, p. 158; and Lauren Loricchio, 
“Second State Enacts SALT Cap Workaround,” State Tax Notes, May 14, 
2018, p. 746.
3
See, e.g., Notice 2018-54, 2018 24 IRB 750 (IRS notice explaining that 
the agency is looking into the legal effect of the workarounds); Joseph 
Bankman et al., “State Responses to Federal Tax Reform: Charitable Tax 
Credits,” State Tax Notes, Apr. 30, 2018, p. 433; and Andy Grewal, “The 
Charitable Contribution Strategy: An Ineffective SALT Substitute.”
4
See U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2 (the supremacy clause).
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workarounds, focusing on those that take 
advantage of the federal deduction for charitable 
contributions. Part II then outlines the case for 
federal preemption of the workarounds, first 
exploring federal preemption doctrine and 
obstacle preemption in particular. The standard 
for obstacle preemption is murky, but generally 
speaking, state law that frustrates federal policy is 
preemptable, though a presumption against 
preemption can save state laws. This part then 
analyzes the SALT cap workarounds under the 
obstacle  preemption case law, concluding  that  
the workarounds are squarely within the aim of 
obstacle preemption where they represent 
formalistic actions designed solely to frustrate the 
operation of the SALT cap. Part III contrasts that 
analysis with a look at existing state programs 
similar to the workarounds. Those existing 
programs stand a greater chance of being saved 
by the presumption against preemption than the 
SALT cap workarounds. Finally, Part IV 
concludes.
I. The States’ SALT Cap Workarounds
The SALT cap workarounds have taken 
numerous forms, though three are most 
prominent. The first, which I will focus on in this 
article given its popularity, involves providing a 
large credit against state taxes for donations to 
state-sponsored charitable organizations. The 
idea behind this workaround is that the donation 
to the organization will generate a federal tax 
deduction for the taxpayer under IRC section 170, 
and the organization will be able to spend the 
money as the state would have if the payment had 
been in the form of a tax payment rather than a 
deductible charitable donation.5 The remaining 
two workarounds involve shifting state income 
taxes to payroll taxes paid by businesses (which 
remain deductible)6 and providing for deductible 
taxes on passthrough entities accompanied with 
offsetting individual state income tax credits.7
The states enacting the SALT cap 
workarounds have made their intentions clear: 
they do not like the SALT cap and want to provide 
their taxpayers with the means to get around it. 
For instance, New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo (D) 
asked state lawmakers to “change our tax code in 
a way that thwarts [the federal] attack” that is the 
SALT cap.8 New Jersey Gov. Phil Murphy (D) 
described the SALT cap as “a de facto tax hike on 
countless New Jersey households” before 
providing that “we’re going to give residents back 
some of this much-needed tax deduction.”9
The effectiveness of these workarounds 
remains to be seen. The IRS has promised 
guidance on whether it will respect their form for 
federal income tax purposes.10 Many have argued 
that the charitable contributions in particular 
should not qualify taxpayers for the federal tax 
deduction for charitable contributions because 
they are getting something of value in return: a 
reduction of their state taxes.11 Others counter that 
states have long offered tax reductions for 
donations to some organizations and that the IRS 
has allowed taxpayers to claim full federal tax 
deductions for those same donations.12 For 
example, the Georgia qualified education expense 
tax credit offers eligible taxpayers tax credits for 
donations to organizations that provide 
scholarships for children who attend private 
schools.13 Assuming these latter arguments are 
correct and the SALT cap workarounds 
technically function as designed, are they still 
problematic? Under federal preemption doctrine, 
the answer is yes.
II. Preemption and the SALT Cap Workarounds
Because the SALT cap workarounds are state 
laws rather than individual actions, they raise the 
5
See Bankman et al., supra note 3.
6
See Daniel Hemel, “Repeal of the SALT Deduction for Income Taxes 
Might Not Raise a Cent, Whatever Source Derived,” Medium.com, Nov. 
9, 2017.
7
See Amy Hamilton, “Legislature Approves Passthrough SALT 
Workaround,” State Tax Notes, May 11, 2018, p. 723.
8
Jeanne Sahadi, “How New York’s Governor Wants to Get Around 
the SALT Cap,” CNN Money, Jan 16, 2018.
9
Dustin Racioppi, “Help for NJ’s High Property Taxes? Phil Murphy 
Signs Workaround to Trump Tax Code Rewrite,” NorthJersey.com, May 
4, 2018.
10
Notice 2018-54, 2018-24 IRB 750.
11
E.g., Peter L. Faber, “Do Charitable Contributions Avoid the TCJA 
SALT Deduction Limit?” State Tax Notes, Apr. 23, 2018, p. 309.
12
See Bankman et al., supra note 3.
13
Ga. Code Ann. section 48-7-29.16. A comprehensive list of such 
preexisting programs can be found in the Appendix to Joseph Bankman 
et al., supra note 3.
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fundamental issue of preemption. The supremacy 
clause of the U.S. Constitution declares that “the 
Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State 
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”14 Simply put, when state law 
conflicts with federal law, federal law wins. In a 
watershed case for preemption doctrine, 
McCulloch v. Maryland,15 Chief Justice John 
Marshall described the impact and importance of 
the supremacy clause on federal-state relations:
It is of the very essence of supremacy to 
remove all obstacles to its action within its 
own sphere, and so to modify every power 
vested in subordinate governments, as to 
exempt its own operations from their own 
influence. This effect need not be stated in 
terms. It is so involved in the declaration 
of supremacy, so necessarily implied in it, 
that the expression of it could not make it 
more certain.16
Determining when state law conflicts with 
federal law is not quite so simple, however.17 The 
next section explores the state of the doctrine, 
focusing particularly on a form of preemption 
known as obstacle preemption.18
A. Federal Preemption Doctrine
The various ways in which federal law might 
preempt state law were recently described by the 
Supreme Court in Murphy v. NCAA:
Our cases have identified three different 
types of preemption — “conflict,” 
“express,” and “field” — but all of them 
work in the same way: Congress enacts a 
law that imposes restrictions or confers 
rights on private actors; a state law confers 
rights or imposes restrictions that conflict 
with the federal law; and therefore the 
federal law takes precedence and the state 
law is preempted.19
Because the IRC does not expressly prohibit 
states from imposing income taxes on their 
residents, express preemption is not at issue 
regarding the SALT cap workarounds.20 It is also 
unlikely that Congress intended to occupy the 
entire field of income tax law through the IRC, so 
field preemption is also not at issue here.21 The 
remaining type of preemption — conflict 
preemption — may invalidate the SALT cap 
workarounds.
Conflict preemption breaks down into two 
forms: impossibility preemption and obstacle 
preemption.22 Impossibility preemption requires 
that it be “impossible for a private party to comply 
with both state and federal requirements.”23 For 
example, in Mutual Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Bartlett, 
the Court found a state tort law affecting the 
labelling of pharmaceuticals to be preempted by 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
because “it was impossible for Mutual to comply 
with both its state-law duty to strengthen the 
warnings on sulindac’s label and its federal-law 
duty not to alter sulindac’s label.”24 This form of 
preemption is not at issue in the current analysis 
because it is not impossible for a taxpayer to 
comply with both federal and state law.25
Thus, obstacle preemption remains. Obstacle 
preemption looks to whether the state law at issue 
frustrates the objectives of Congress.26 The 
standard for obstacle preemption demands a 
consideration of the “entire scheme of the 
14
U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2.
15
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
16
Id. at 427.
17
See, e.g., Gregory M. Dickinson, “An Empirical Study of Obstacle 
Preemption in the Supreme Court,” 89 Neb. L. Rev. 682, 682 (2011) (“The 
Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence over the last few decades 
has been unpredictable to say the least.”).
18
Obstacle preemption is also sometimes referred to as “purposes 
and objectives” preemption. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009) 
(Thomas, J., concurring).
19
Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 584 U.S. __, at *21-
22 (2018) (internal citations omitted).
20
Express preemption occurs when the federal law expressly 
prohibits overlapping state legislation. See id. at *22.
21
Field preemption occurs when the federal regime is so pervasive 
that there is no room for additional state regulation. See id.
22
E.g., Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 
(2000) (“We will find preemption where it is impossible for a private 
party to comply with both state and federal law, and where ‘under the 
circumstances of [a] particular case, [the challenged state law] stands as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress.’”) (internal citations omitted); and Arizona v. 
United States, 567 U.S. 387, 400 (2012).
23
E.g., Mutual Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 480 (2013) 
(internal citations omitted).
24
Id.
25
See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372-73.
26
Id.
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[federal] statute” in order to identify “its purpose 
and intended effects”; if the state law frustrates 
the operation of the federal statute or impedes the 
“natural effect” of the statute, the state law must 
yield.27 Though the standard appears to demand a 
broad consideration of the federal law, the Court 
often focuses on the particular parts of a larger 
statutory regime that the state law conflicts with.28 
As the Court has explained, “in assessing the 
impact of a state law on the federal scheme, we 
have refused to rely solely on the legislature’s 
professed purpose and have looked as well to the 
effects of the law.”29 Ultimately, whether the state 
law presents a significant enough obstacle to the 
federal law is a matter of judgment.30
In performing this analysis, a court should 
consider the provision at issue, its history, any 
explanation of its objectives, and current views of 
the preemptive effect of the provision.31 Also, the 
state law must frustrate a significant objective of 
the federal law; peripheral objectives are not the 
concern.32 Finally, under the presumption against 
preemption, a court avoids reading federal 
statutes to intrude on traditional state powers, 
such as taxation,33 “in the absence of a clear 
indication that they do.”34 However, the 
supremacy clause cannot be “evaded by 
formalism”;35 a state cannot mask a direct assault 
on federal law or policy through a formalistic 
application of traditional state powers.
Often an obstacle preemption case involves a 
state law that imposes burdens on a person 
beyond what federal law requires. For example, in 
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. Inc.,36 a state law 
imposing state-level tort liability on car 
manufacturers who did not install airbags in their 
cars was found to frustrate the federal policy of 
allowing manufacturers to choose between 
installing airbags or automatic seatbelts in order 
to meet safety standards.
However, in some cases, the state law at issue 
has provided an avenue for a person to escape 
federal burdens. For example, in Hillman v. 
Maretta,37 the Court considered a challenge to a 
Virginia law that held a former spouse liable for 
insurance proceeds to whoever would have 
received them under applicable law but for the 
former spouse being designated the beneficiary. 
That law conflicted with the Federal Employees’ 
Group Life Insurance Act, which provided that 
insurance proceeds were to be paid to the 
designated beneficiary first. The Virginia law did 
not make it impossible for the federal law to 
operate — the life insurance proceeds would still 
be paid out to the designated beneficiary. Rather 
the law conflicted with the federal law by 
providing an avenue for those proceeds to be 
stripped away from the designated beneficiary.
Observing that there was a presumption 
against preemption in Hillman because the 
“regulation of domestic relations is traditionally 
the domain of state law,” the Court noted that the 
state law must do “‘major damage’ to ‘clear and 
substantial’ federal interests” before the state law 
is preempted.38 The Court then began its analysis 
by determining the nature of the federal interest, 
which it described as ensuring that a duly named 
beneficiary would receive the insurance proceeds 
and be able to make use of them.39 The Court also 
observed that it made no difference to the case 
that the state law did not actually require the 
transfer of proceeds but instead created a cause of 
action enabling someone to effectuate such a 
transfer. In the Court’s view, the Virginia law 
“frustrates the deliberate purpose of Congress” 
because it “displaces the beneficiary selected by 
27
Id. (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); see also 
Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 
713 (1985).
28
E.g., Hillman v. Maretta, 569 U.S. 483 (2013) (considering state law 
conflict with beneficiary designation provisions of the Federal 
Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act); Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 
at 400 (considering state law conflict with particular federal alien-
registration requirements in the federal immigration law regime); and 
Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America Inc., 562 U.S. 323, 330 (2011) 
(considering whether state law conflicted with the provisions of 
Standard 208 issued under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety 
Act).
29
See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Association, 505 U.S. 88, 
105-06 (1992).
30
Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373.
31
See Williamson, 562 U.S. at 330.
32
Id.
33
See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
34
E.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2088 (2014); see also Wyeth 
v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009).
35
Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 742 (2009).
36
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. Inc., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
37
Hillman, 569 U.S. 483.
38
Id. at 490-491.
39
Id. at 493-494.
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the insured . . . and places someone else in her 
stead.”40 The Virginia law was preempted.
In Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing LLC,41 the 
Court affirmed that Maryland’s efforts to work 
around federal rates for electricity were 
preempted because they conflicted with the rates 
set by the Federal Energy Regulatory Committee. 
Hughes is a narrow case concerning a specific area 
of law42 — interstate electricity rates — but 
indicates the Court’s discomfort with state actions 
that intentionally undermine federal law.43 As the 
Court observed:
States may not seek to achieve ends, 
however legitimate, through regulatory 
means that intrude on FERC’s authority 
over interstate wholesale rates, as 
Maryland has done here. See [Oneck Inc. v. 
Learjet Inc., 575 U.S. __ (2015)] 
(distinguishing between “measures aimed 
directly at interstate purchasers and 
wholesalers for resale, and those aimed at 
subjects left to the states to regulate.”)44
Obstacle preemption analysis can be murky,45 
but as described, some guideposts do exist. First, 
the state law in question must frustrate a 
significant federal policy. Second, if that 
frustration is only incidental to the state 
exercising one of its fundamental powers, the 
state law has a stronger chance of being permitted 
to stand thanks to the presumption against 
preemption.
B. The Case Against the SALT Cap Workarounds
In the case of the SALT cap workarounds, the 
states are certainly reacting to the changes of the 
TCJA, but are they frustrating federal policy? The 
House Committee Report on the TCJA said the 
following regarding the reasons for the SALT cap:
The Committee believes that scaling back 
existing tax incentives, including the 
deduction for State and local taxes, makes 
the system simpler and fairer for all 
families and individuals, and allows for 
lower tax rates. The Committee further 
believes that modification of this 
provision to apply only to real property 
taxes is consistent with streamlining the 
tax code, broadening the tax base, 
lowering rates, and growing the 
economy.46
Though federal lawmakers did not provide 
much further insight into the policy behind the 
imposition of the SALT cap, there are numerous 
possible policies that might be considered core to 
the SALT cap such that they are substantial 
enough for preemption analysis to come into play.
First, the TCJA as a whole was intended to 
lower federal tax burdens and simplify filing by 
limiting itemized deductions and pushing more 
people into claiming the standard deduction.47 
The SALT cap workarounds do not necessarily 
frustrate the goal of lowering federal tax burdens 
as they further lower federal tax burdens, but the 
Court has recognized that a “conflict in technique 
can be fully as disruptive to the system Congress 
erected as conflict in overt policy.”48 Also, the 
TCJA did not seek to eliminate federal tax 
burdens, but to lower them to a specific point. The 
SALT cap workarounds frustrate that objective by 
offering an avenue for lowering federal tax 
burdens past the intended point. The 
workarounds do conflict with the simplification 
goal by offering taxpayers an avenue to claim 
more itemized deductions, at least in the case of 
the charitable contribution workarounds.
More specifically, the policy behind enacting 
the SALT cap may have been to alter taxpayers’ 
40
Id. at 494.
41
Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016).
42
Id. at 1299.
43
Cf. Haywood, 556 U.S. at 736 (“Although States retain substantial 
leeway to establish the contours of their judicial systems, they lack 
authority to nullify a federal right or cause of action they believe is 
inconsistent with their local policies.”).
44
Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1298 (emphasis in original).
45
See Williamson, 562 U.S. at 342 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“That the 
Court in Geier reached an opposite conclusion [than the one in this case] 
reveals the utterly unconstrained nature of purposes-and-objectives pre-
emption. There is certainly ‘considerable similarity between this case 
and Geier.’”).
46
H.R. Rep. No. 115-409, Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (115th Congress 2017-
2018).
47
Id. (“H.R. 1, as reported by the Committee on Ways and Means, 
makes comprehensive reforms to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to 
provide tax relief and simplification to American families and 
individuals so that they can keep more of what they earn and devote less 
time and resources to filing their tax returns.”).
48
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 406 (2012) (citing Motor Coach 
Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 287 (1971)).
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federal tax burdens as a way to reduce the 
regressivity of the cap and the federal 
subsidization of state taxes. The history and 
commentary surrounding the SALT cap point 
toward this purpose, as the SALT cap has long 
been criticized on such grounds.49 Alternatively, 
the policy behind implementing the cap may have 
been more practical: to raise revenue to offset tax 
cuts in other parts of the TCJA. Despite the 
difficulty of determining the precise reason the 
SALT cap was in the TCJA, this much is clear: the 
implementation of the SALT cap could free up to 
$1 trillion in the next 10 years.50
The SALT cap workarounds clearly frustrate 
these policies: They permit taxpayers to alter their 
federal tax burdens, retain the regressivity of the 
SALT cap, continue the federal subsidization of 
state taxes, and reduce the revenue brought in by 
the SALT cap.51 The blueprint for the preemption 
case against the workarounds might even be 
found in the earliest of cases, McCulloch v. 
Maryland.52 Following the War of 1812, the United 
States found itself in financial straits and 
established the Second Bank of the United States 
for support.53 In an act of protest against the bank, 
Maryland attempted to tax it. The Court 
determined that the tax imposed on the bank 
“would abridge, and almost annihilate [the] 
useful and necessary right of the [federal] 
legislature to select its means.”54 The Maryland tax 
was preempted.
However, preemption doctrine has evolved 
since McCulloch, and, in the case of the SALT cap 
workarounds, the states are exercising their 
fundamental tax powers to achieve their goals. 
The states are providing state tax benefits to 
effectuate the workarounds, so perhaps they 
should not be preempted. Though the 
presumption against preemption often protects 
state law in such circumstances, the presumption 
is not absolute. Here, as in Hillman and Hughes, 
the states are directly targeting the federal law 
through the workarounds, significantly 
damaging the case for the presumption to protect 
the workarounds. Furthermore, the workarounds 
appear to be an exercise in formalism: the states 
are not advancing any state tax policy, they are 
using their laws to offer a workaround to federal 
tax policy. Preempting these types of state actions 
is hardly a case of the federal government 
encroaching on traditional state powers; 
formalism cannot be used to avoid the supremacy 
clause.55
Even so, a state exercising its traditional 
powers in this way does not prevent the federal 
government from achieving its goals by simply 
disregarding the state action for federal purposes. 
A taxpayer can have a charitable deduction at the 
state level and none at the federal level, and the 
federal-state balance is hardly upset. In this line of 
thinking, the state cannot frustrate the federal law 
because it has no real power over the federal law.
It is true that Congress can disregard the state 
actions for federal purposes, but Congress is not 
required to explicitly do so in all instances.56 The 
fact that there are forms of implied preemption is 
proof of this proposition. If the congressional 
intent was to enact a particular policy, then the 
states should not be permitted to directly and 
substantially frustrate that policy regardless of 
the various remedies available to Congress. Not 
forcing Congress to revisit its laws because of 
state action is the basis of implied preemption.57 In 
49
See Joseph J. Thorndike, “Tax History: The SALT Deduction Has 
Always Been Hard to Defend — And to Kill,” Tax Notes, Oct. 9, 2017, p. 
176 (detailing the history of the SALT cap and arguments for and against 
it).
50
Id.
51
Cf. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 377 (2000) 
(“We used the metaphor of the bargaining chip to describe the 
President’s control of funds valuable to a hostile country; here the state 
Act reduces the value of the chips created by the federal statute. It thus 
‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.’”) (internal citations omitted).
52
McCulloch, 17 U.S. 316.
53
Andrew T. Hill, “The Second Bank of the United States,” Federal 
Reserve History.
54
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 419.
55
Haywood, 556 U.S. at 742.
56
See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 387-88 (“A failure to provide for preemption 
expressly may reflect nothing more than the settled character of implied 
preemption doctrine that courts will dependably apply, and in any event 
the existence of conflict cognizable under the Supremacy Clause does 
not depend on express congressional recognition that federal and state 
law may conflict. The State’s interference of congressional intent is 
unwarranted here, therefore, simply because the silence of Congress is 
ambiguous.”).
57
See Caleb Nelson, “Preemption,” 86 Va. L. Rev. 225, 277-78 (2000) 
(framing implied preemption as “an exercise in ‘imaginative 
reconstruction’” which represents “an attempt to resolve preemption 
questions in a way that the enacting Congress would have liked). As 
Nelson notes, ascribing a purpose or intention to a particular Congress is 
a difficult, if not impossible, task, id. at 280-282. This criticism is duly 
noted, but given that the Supreme Court is willing to engage in the 
discovery of congressional intent, the analysis here will proceed as the 
Court does.
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other words, if express preemption was the only 
form of preemption, then Congress would need to 
account for all scenarios in which it intended to 
preempt state law. Rather, implied preemption 
recognizes that when Congress intends to enact a 
particular policy, it can also be presumed to 
intend not to permit the states to frustrate that 
policy.58 Without implied preemption, Congress 
would need to amend its statutes to preempt 
conflicting state actions. The Court has indicated 
that requiring Congress to amend its statutes 
would be a substantial obstacle, though the 
obstacle might be lessened when Congress 
delegates authority to an agency to administer the 
law.59
C. Weaknesses in the Case
The preemption case against the SALT cap 
workarounds is not without weaknesses. Two 
major weaknesses of the argument are that the 
workarounds rely on another provision of the IRC 
for their effect and that the IRS is tasked with 
administering the code.
That the workarounds rely on IRC section 170 
to achieve their goals presents a hurdle for the 
preemption case. As others have observed, section 
170 demonstrates a federal purpose to encourage 
charitable deductions to arms of state and local 
governments.60 Therefore, at a minimum, the 
SALT cap workarounds frustrate one part of the 
federal tax code by advancing the purposes of 
another part of the federal tax code.61 In a way, the 
federal tax code is frustrating its own purposes 
through the potentially conflicting goals of 
sections 170 and 164.62 The SALT cap 
workarounds merely expose that conflict, which 
Congress should have to resolve.
The resolution of this issue may depend on 
how narrowly a court construes a preemption 
challenge (a challenge alleging conflict only under 
section 164 and not the IRC at large would stand a 
greater chance of success), but there is reason to 
believe that a narrow challenge is appropriate. 
First, the states have specifically targeted section 
164, not the larger federal tax code, which may 
counsel in favor of examining whether the states 
have achieved that goal. Second, as noted, the 
workarounds are highly formalistic, calling into 
question whether the relabeling of the taxpayer’s 
taxes to charitable deductions advances the 
causes of section 170. Finally, it is not clear under 
the preemption doctrine that advancing federal 
interests is enough to overcome the frustration of 
other federal interests.63 For example, in Arizona v. 
United States, the Court found a state law 
prohibiting illegal immigrants  from  seeking  
employment  was  preempted  despite  the  fact  
that  it  “attempt[ed]  to achieve one of the same 
goals of federal law.”64 The law was preempted 
because it conflicted with federal law in  another 
way — method  of  enforcement.  If  the  goal of 
obstacle preemption is to prevent federal-state 
conflicts, there is reason to believe that covering a 
58
See Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corporation Commission of 
Kansas, 489 U.S. 493 (1989) (“Congress has the power under the 
Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution to pre-empt state 
law. Determining whether it has exercised this power requires that we 
examine congressional intent. In the absence of explicit statutory 
language signaling an intent to pre-empt, we infer such intent . . . where 
the state law at issue conflicts with federal law.”).
59
See Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Labs. Inc., 471 U.S. 
707, 721 (1985) (“Our analysis would be somewhat different had 
Congress not delegated to the FDA the administration of the federal 
program. Congress, unlike an agency, normally does not follow, years 
after the enactment of federal legislation, the effects of external factors 
on the goals that the federal legislation sought to promote. Moreover, it 
is more difficult for Congress to make its intentions known — for 
example by amending a statute — than it is for an agency to amend its 
regulations or to otherwise indicate its position.”).
60
See Bankman et al., supra note 3.
61
Many thanks to Kirk Stark for raising this point.
62
Cf. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. C.I.R., 972 F.2d 858, 868 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(Easterbrook) (“Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code do not conflict 
with ‘tax policy,’ as the Commissioner seems to believe. They are tax 
policy and are to be enforced.”). Many thanks to Andy Grewal for this 
citation.
63
See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1971) (“Any state legislation 
which frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law is rendered invalid 
by the Supremacy Clause.”); see also Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. at 
406 (finding a state law that “attempts to achieve one of the same goals 
of federal law” preempted under conflict preemption principles because 
it conflicted with federal law in another way — method of enforcement); 
Crosby, 530 U.S. at 379 (“The conflicts [between state and federal law] 
are not rendered irrelevant by the State’s argument that there is no real 
conflict between the statutes because they share the same goals and 
because some companies may comply with both sets of restrictions. The 
fact of a common end hardly neutralizes conflicting means[.]”); and Gade 
v. National Solid Wastes Management Association, 505 U.S. 88, 103 (1992) 
(“To allow a State selectively to ‘supplement’ certain federal regulations 
with ostensibly nonconflicting standards would be inconsistent with this 
federal scheme of establishing uniform federal standards, on the one 
hand, and encouraging States to assume full responsibility for 
development and enforcement of their own OSH programs, on the 
other.”).
64
Arizona v. U.S., 567 U.S. at 406 (finding a state law that “attempts to 
achieve one of the same goals of federal law” preempted under conflict 
preemption principles because it conflicted with federal law in another 
way — method of enforcement).
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conflict with an advancement of other federal 
goals would not achieve that goal.
Another major hurdle to the preemption case is 
that the IRS has the authority to administer the IRC 
and can revisit the law in light of the states’ actions. 
Indeed, it has already stated that it will do so in this 
case.65 That the IRS may issue guidance regarding 
the SALT cap workarounds that advances the 
federal tax law policy indicates that the 
workarounds are not substantial obstacles to the 
federal law.66 However, in Automated Medical 
Laboratories, in which the Supreme Court indicated 
that the administration of the law by an agency can 
reduce the obstacle presented by conflicting state 
law, the Food and Drug Administration was tasked 
with substantial authority over setting standards 
for the collection of blood plasma.67 The IRS has 
significant authority over the IRC, but sections 170 
and 164 define charitable contributions and taxes 
with a degree of specificity that may indicate that 
the IRS has less room to address the SALT cap 
workarounds.
Finally, it is unclear when a preemption 
challenge to the SALT cap workarounds would 
become ripe. As laid out in Arizona v. United States, 
the Court will not seek out conflicts when none 
clearly exists; when uncertainty exists, the state law 
must be given time to operate to uncover a conflict 
with federal law.68 It may be that the SALT cap 
workarounds do not create an actual conflict with 
federal law, particularly if the IRS disregards their 
form for federal tax purposes. In such a case, the 
preemption analysis would be unnecessary.
III. Georgia on My Mind
What about the charitable deduction schemes 
in place in a variety of states before the enactment 
of the TCJA? If the SALT cap workarounds are 
preempted, should the existing schemes also be 
preempted? The answer is less clear for one reason. 
Though these schemes substantively do frustrate 
the federal law in a manner similar if not identical 
to the SALT cap workarounds, they may be saved 
by the presumption against preemption. If those 
laws were not designed solely to target federal law, 
then the presumption against preemption may 
require a clear statement from Congress that it 
intended to preempt these state programs when 
enacting the TCJA with the SALT cap. No such 
clear statement exists, so these programs might 
withstand a preemption attack.
These programs may have been set up in large 
part to permit alternative minimum tax payers to 
avoid the disallowance of the section 164 
deduction.69 If that were the sole motivation for the 
earlier programs, there is nothing to distinguish 
them from the SALT cap workarounds (except 
perhaps the current rhetoric from the states 
adopting the workarounds). However, given that 
the existing programs had no substantive effect for 
non-AMT payers before the enactment of the 
TCJA,70 in comparison to the SALT cap 
workarounds the purpose behind the programs 
may be more credibly articulated as implementing 
substantive state policies of supporting various 
types of organizations, such as schools and 
hospitals.71 In this case, the laws would not be a 
mere formalistic application of traditional state 
powers, and the presumption against preemption 
might save them under the TCJA.
Admittedly, the line between some of the 
existing state programs and the new SALT cap 
workarounds under this analysis is razor thin. The 
legal resolution may depend on which type of law 
is challenged first, as it seems inequitable to 
grandfather old programs while prohibiting the 
new workarounds when both have the same 
substantive effect (and when many of the old 
programs are being marketed as means for 
avoiding the SALT cap.)72
65
See Notice 2018-54, 2018-24 IRB 750.
66
See supra note 59.
67
See Automated Medical Laboratories, 471 U.S. at 710.
68
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. at 415.
69
See Carl Davis, “State Tax Subsidies for Private K-12 Education,” 
Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (Oct. 2016).
70
Because SALT deductions were uncapped and charitable 
deductions were capped under prior law, these laws did little if anything 
to incentivize federal tax avoidance. Furthermore, the value of the 
deductions was the same for both, so the federal government likely was 
indifferent as to which the taxpayer claimed.
71
See, e.g., Ala. Code section 16-6D-2(b) (describing the purpose of 
multiple provisions, including some state tax credits, as “to advance the 
benefits of local school and school system autonomy in innovation and 
creativity by allowing flexibility from state laws, regulations, and 
policies”).
72
See Carl Davis, “The Other SALT Cap Workaround: Accountants 
Steer Clients Toward Private K-12 Voucher Tax Credits,” Institute on 
Taxation and Economic Policy (June 2018) (cataloguing such efforts).
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IV. Conclusion
The case for preemption of the SALT cap 
workarounds exists, even if it is not bulletproof. 
How such a case would come out is murky, as 
many preemption cases are. On the one hand, 
states should not be encouraged or able to 
intentionally frustrate federal policy that they 
disagree with. In this instance, the clear 
motivations behind the workarounds would seem 
to bring them directly into the crosshairs of the 
obstacle preemption doctrine. Should a state be 
rewarded for explicitly intending to obscure 
federal policy, no matter how repugnant it may be 
to the state?
On the other hand, taxation is a fundamental 
power of the states that should not be lightly 
interfered with by the courts. If there is a 
legitimate purpose to be found for enacting the 
workarounds, it is more difficult to justify 
preempting the state laws for their effects on 
federal law. Certainly, states that did not have 
these tax programs in place before the TCJA 
should not be precluded from adopting them now 
if the old programs remain effective. And though 
Congress is not asked to explicitly provide for 
preemption in every instance, it also should not be 
given a blank pass for sloppy legislation that 
created the loopholes that are being exploited. Is it 
truly against federal policy for a state to assist a 
taxpayer in taking advantage of another part of 
the same statute? Perhaps the answer will come 
down to who acted most poorly: the federal 
government in enacting the TCJA or the states in 
directly targeting that law with their 
workarounds. 
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